We present a highly efficient cryptographic protocol to protect user passwords against server compromise by distributing the capability to verify passwords over multiple servers. Password verification is a single-round protocol and requires from each server only one exponentiation in a prime-order group. In spite of its simplicity, our scheme boasts security against dynamic and transient corruptions, meaning that servers can be corrupted at any time and can recover from corruption by going through a non-interactive key refresh procedure. The users' passwords remain secure against of-fline dictionary attacks as long as not all servers are corrupted within the same time period between refreshes. The only currently known scheme to achieve such strong security guarantees incurs the considerable cost of several hundred exponentiations per server. We prove our scheme secure in the universal composability model, which is well-known to offer important benefits for password-based primitives, under the gap one-more Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random-oracle model. Server initialization and refresh must take place in a trusted execution environment. Initialization additionally requires a secure message to each server, but the refresh procedure is non-interactive. We show that these requirements are easily met in practice by providing an example deployment architecture.