Quantization games on networks

Abstract

We consider a network quantizer design setting where agents must balance fidelity in representing their local source distributions against their ability to successfully communicate with other connected agents. By casting the problem as a network game, we show existence of Nash equilibrium quantizer designs. For any agent, under Nash equilibrium, the word representing a given partition region is the conditional expectation of the mixture of local and social source probability distributions within the region. Further, the network may converge to equilibrium through a distributed version of the Lloyd-Max algorithm. In contrast to traditional results in the evolution of language, we find several vocabularies may coexist in the Nash equilibrium, with each individual having exactly one of these vocabularies. The overlap between vocabularies is high for individuals that communicate frequently and have similar local sources. Finally, we argue error in translation along a chain of communication does not grow if and only if the chain consists of agents with shared vocabulary. © 2013 IEEE.