Fully-Secure MPC with Minimal Trust
The task of achieving full security (with guaranteed output delivery) in secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a long-studied problem with known impossibility results that rule out constructions in the dishonest majority setting. In this work, we investigate the question of constructing fully-secure MPC protocols in the dishonest majority setting with the help of an external trusted party (TP). It is well-known that the existence of such a trusted party is sufficient to bypass the impossibility results. As our goal is to study the minimal requirements needed from this trusted party, we restrict ourselves to the extreme setting where the size of the TP is independent of the size of the functionality to be computed (called "small" TP) and this TP is invoked only once during the protocol execution. We present several positive and negative results for fully-secure MPC in this setting. - For a natural class of protocols, specifically, those with a universal output decoder, we show that the size of the TP must necessarily be exponential in the number of parties. This result holds irrespective of the computational assumptions used in the protocol. This class is broad enough to capture the prior results and indicates that the prior techniques necessitate the use of an exponential-sized TP. We additionally rule out the possibility of achieving information-theoretic full security (without the restriction of using a universal output decoder) using a "small" TP in the plain model (i.e., without any setup). - In order to get around the above negative result, we consider protocols without a universal output decoder. The main positive result in our work is a construction of such a fully-secure MPC protocol assuming the existence of a succinct Functional Encryption scheme. We also give evidence that such an assumption is likely to be necessary for fully-secure MPC in certain restricted settings. - We also explore the possibility of achieving full-security with a semi-honest TP that could collude with the other malicious parties in the protocol (which are in a dishonest majority). In this setting, we show that fairness is impossible to achieve even if we allow the size of the TP to grow with the circuit-size of the function to be computed.