Cyber deception for wireless network virtualization using stackelberg game theory

Abstract

Wireless virtualization is becoming a popular solution to resource sharing problems integral in providing access to future wireless networking applications by enabling access to the same physical wireless infrastructure by multiple virtual networks concurrently. This paper investigates cyber deception using game theory model for defining the deceptive interactions between a cyber attacker and the defender. We consider both the naive attacker who is not aware of the defender's strategy, and the rational (powerful) attacker who knows the defense strategy. In the Stackelberg game, the defender controls the observable configuration of the network when probed by an attacker. We show that the process for selecting an optimal defense strategy against a naive attacker is NP-hard. We also proposed an algorithm for computing optimal strategy for a naive attacker and a greedy based algorithm for selecting the optimal strategy against a powerful attacker. Results from extensive simulation runs show the scalability and effectiveness of the proposed approaches based on the run time in finding the optimum defense strategy as well as minimizing the attacker's utility are better than the approaches in state of the art literature.