Heinz Koeppl, Marc Hafner, et al.
BMC Bioinformatics
When mobile agents do comparison shopping for their owners, they are subject to attacks of malicious hosts executing the agents. We present a family of protocols that protect the computation results established by free-roaming mobile agents. Our protocols enable the owner of the agent to detect upon its return whether a visited host has maliciously altered the state of the agent, thus providing forward integrity and truncation resilience. In an environment without public-key infrastructure, the protocols are based only on a secret hash chain. With a public-key infrastructure, the protocols also guarantee non-repudiability. © 1998 Springer-Verlag London Ltd.
Heinz Koeppl, Marc Hafner, et al.
BMC Bioinformatics
Maurice Hanan, Peter K. Wolff, et al.
DAC 1976
Indranil R. Bardhan, Sugato Bagchi, et al.
JMIS
Gal Badishi, Idit Keidar, et al.
IEEE TDSC