About cookies on this site Our websites require some cookies to function properly (required). In addition, other cookies may be used with your consent to analyze site usage, improve the user experience and for advertising. For more information, please review your options. By visiting our website, you agree to our processing of information as described in IBM’sprivacy statement. To provide a smooth navigation, your cookie preferences will be shared across the IBM web domains listed here.
Publication
Allerton 2008
Conference paper
N-player bertrand-cournot games in queues: Existence of equilibrium
Abstract
We develop a framework to study implications of Quality of service (QoS)-sensitive users on market equilibrium. We consider multiple competing providers each offering a queued service. Each provider posts a price and expected delay. Arriving users then pick the queue with the smallest price plus expected delay cost. We first consider the case where the providers are strategic and compete on price, when their capacity is fixed. We obtain conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game. We then consider the case where the providers invest in capacity and set price simultaneously. We intend to extend this to queues with multiple classes of service as a framework to study differentiated services in networks. © 2008 IEEE.