09:15 - 09:45 Coffee and Registration
09:45 - 10:35 Keynote: Limor Shmerling Magazanik, Israel Tech Policy Institute
10:35 - 11:15 Morning Session
- Adi Akavia, University of Haifa - Secure-Search on Data and Query Encrypted with Fully-Homomorphic Encryption
11:15 - 11:30 Coffee break
11:30 - 13:30 Noon Session
- Ittai Anati, Intel - Intel® SGX: What, Why, Where, and more
- Benny Pinkas, Bar Ilan University - MPC Beyond the Generic Model - Private Intersection Analytics
- Allon Adir, IBM Research - Practical applications of privacy-preserving encryption schemes
Abstract:
In 2013, Intel released the specification of the new revolutionary instruction set extension for Intel® SGX. In 2015 the 6th generation Core™ CPU was released with support for Intel® SGX. This talk will describe what SGX is about, contrast past ideas on roadmap direction with present, and touch on some late interesting findings.
In 2013, Intel released the specification of the new revolutionary instruction set extension for Intel® SGX. In 2015 the 6th generation Core™ CPU was released with support for Intel® SGX. This talk will describe what SGX is about, contrast past ideas on roadmap direction with present, and touch on some late interesting findings.
Abstract:
Effective data analysis often depends on data that is known to different sources, including private data whose owners cannot disclose. The task at hand is to perform effective analysis of the data while preserving its privacy. This talk will describe efficient cryptographic protocols, some of them based on variants of private set intersection (PSI), that can be applied to perform private analysis of data.
Effective data analysis often depends on data that is known to different sources, including private data whose owners cannot disclose. The task at hand is to perform effective analysis of the data while preserving its privacy. This talk will describe efficient cryptographic protocols, some of them based on variants of private set intersection (PSI), that can be applied to perform private analysis of data.
13:30 - 14:15 Lunch
14:15 - 16:15 Afternoon Session
- Noam Rotem, Cyber-Cyber Labs - Data breaches - Myth vs. Reality
- Ittay Eyal, Technion - Trusted Execution Environments and Blockchains
- Tamer Mour, Weizmann Institute of Science - New Constructions for Distributed Oblivious RAM
Abstract:
This talk will discuss the combination of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Blockchains. The two technologies seem orthogonal: the former provides guarantees from a single principal while the latter allows many principals to form a single trusted entity. Two recent results demonstrate how the combination of the two technologies allow for efficient protocols -- allowing for low-latency high-throughput channels, and reducing the waste due to the infamous Proof of Work used to secure many blockchains.
This talk will discuss the combination of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Blockchains. The two technologies seem orthogonal: the former provides guarantees from a single principal while the latter allows many principals to form a single trusted entity. Two recent results demonstrate how the combination of the two technologies allow for efficient protocols -- allowing for low-latency high-throughput channels, and reducing the waste due to the infamous Proof of Work used to secure many blockchains.
Abstract:
In this work, we present a family of distributed ORAM constructions that follow the hierarchical approach of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] in the single server setting. We enhance known techniques, and develop new ones, to obtain the first ORAM protocols with sub-logarithmic overhead for small block size. We also investigate a model where the servers are allowed to perform a linear amount of light local computations, and show that constant overhead is achievable in this model,through a simple four-server ORAM protocol. Through the theoretical lens, this is the first ORAM scheme with asymptotic constant overhead, and polylogarithmic block size, that does not use homomorphic encryption. Practically speaking, evidence from related work makes us believe that despite the linear computational overhead, the construction is potentially very efficient in practice, in particular when applied to secure computation.
In this work, we present a family of distributed ORAM constructions that follow the hierarchical approach of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] in the single server setting. We enhance known techniques, and develop new ones, to obtain the first ORAM protocols with sub-logarithmic overhead for small block size. We also investigate a model where the servers are allowed to perform a linear amount of light local computations, and show that constant overhead is achievable in this model,through a simple four-server ORAM protocol. Through the theoretical lens, this is the first ORAM scheme with asymptotic constant overhead, and polylogarithmic block size, that does not use homomorphic encryption. Practically speaking, evidence from related work makes us believe that despite the linear computational overhead, the construction is potentially very efficient in practice, in particular when applied to secure computation.