Quantifying the Bit-Error Resilience of FHE Compute
Augusto Vega, Matías Mazzanti, et al.
HPCA 2025
As systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) that power our devices become increasingly heterogeneous to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements, they also become more vulnerable to the possible impacts of an on-chip resource availability attack. In this paper, we present SoCurity, the first network-on-chip (NoC) counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With this monitoring approach, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection and localization system at the hardware level. The presented detection system uses semi-supervised machine learning models, and requires no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalous activity. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks impacting on-chip resource availability. Our localization engine leverages the inherent interpretability of SoCurity’s NoC counters to locate detected anomalous activity in the SoC for focused recovery. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC implementation for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy and fast detection (∼30μs for prediction on an ASIC) in online experiments. Furthermore, we show that the flagged anomalous activity can be reliably localized for up to 99% of detected anomalous activity in our experiments.
Augusto Vega, Matías Mazzanti, et al.
HPCA 2025
Hans Jacobson, Alper Buyuktosunoglu, et al.
HPCA 2011
Julia Hesse, Michael Rosenberg
Eurocrypt 2025
Naoise Holohan, Spiros Antonatos, et al.
JPC